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1. INTRODUCTION
In search engines, online marketplaces and other human–computer interfaces large collectives of in-
dividuals sequentially interact with numerous alternatives of varying quality. In these contexts, in-
dividual trial and error (exploration) is crucial for uncovering novel high-quality items or solutions,
but entails a high cost for individual agents [Frazier et al. 2014]. Self-interested decision makers, we
will show, are often better off imitating the choices of individuals who have already incurred the costs
of exploration. Although imitation makes sense at the individual level, it deprives the group of addi-
tional information that could have been gleaned by individual explorers [Rogers 1988]. Under these
grim circumstances, certain non-monetary mechanisms can keep imitation forces in check and allow
the collective to reap some of the benefits of the independent collection of information. For example,
in simultaneous exploration problems, a natural equilibrium evolves between explorers and imitators
[Conlisk 1980; Kameda and Nakanishi 2002]. Further, in some collective exploration settings, barriers
to communication such as a sparser communication network among individuals can prove beneficial
at the collective level. They encourage people to explore more, thus supplying useful information to the
group [Fang et al. 2010; Lazer and Friedman 2007; Mason et al. 2008; Toyokawa et al. 2014].
Diversity is known to be a blessing for groups and collectives, as they can leverage the wealth of
information possessed by different individuals [Conradt et al. 2013; Davis-Stober et al. 2014; Mu¨ller-
Trede et al. 2017] or take advantage of the complementarities between group members to solve complex
problems [Clearwater et al. 1991; Hong and Page 2004]. Could some preference diversity be beneficial
in problems where collectives sequentially explore numerous alternatives, and thus despite reducing
the immediate value of social learning lead to an increase in collective welfare?
2. THE MODEL
We use a search model to study the problem, as it exemplifies the trade-off between exploration and ex-
ploitation [March 1991]. We assume that there are N alternatives (or products) X1, ..., XN in a market
populated by M agents A1, ..., AM . The alternatives have an objective utility component uo, which is
identical for all agents, and a subjective component us, which is agent specific. The objective component
uo of each alternative is a draw from an independent and identically distributed (iid) random variable,
normally distributed with mean µo and variance σ2o . The subjective component us of each alternative
is iid normal with mean µs and variance σ2s . The overall utility of an alternative n is then a sum of two
draws from iid normal variables, un = uno + uns, which itself is an iid normal variable with variance
σ2 = σ2o + σ
2
s .
The agents encounter alternatives sequentially and can learn the utility of an alternative un only by
sampling it and paying a search cost c. The agents can sample as many alternatives as desired, but they
can choose only one of the alternatives they have sampled. An example of sampling behavior would be
.
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skimming through book recommendations at Amazon or examining the results provided by a search
engine. We assume that the search cost is constant and that there is no post-sampling uncertainty—by
sampling the alternative, the agents learn its true utility. An agent’s return depends on the utility of
the best alternative discovered so far and the search cost, max(u1, u2, ...un) − n × c. The returns from
sampling one more alternative can be formulated as:
E(un −max(u1, u2, ...un−1)|un > max(u1, u2, ...un−1))− c
When viewed on the level of a single agent, this is a classical optimal stopping problem—as studied
extensively in statistics and economics [DeGroot 1970; Analytis et al. 2015]—in which after examining
each new alternative the agent decides whether to sample further or to stop search. For random search,
the problem has an optimal solution, which can be expressed in the form of a stopping threshold.
In our model, agents do not search randomly. Instead, they follow public popularity information gen-
erated by choices made by previous searchers in the market. After the first agent, a second ormth agent
is asked to make its choice. Now the agent can observe the sum of choices made by previous searchers
in the form of a popularity vector P = {P1, ..., PN} that records the choices of alternatives X1, ..., XN
and is updated whenever an individual makes a choice. Examples of such popularity information would
be product sales, number of song downloads, or number of article citations. The agents sample the al-
ternatives X1, X2...Xn in decreasing order of popularity P1 ≥ P2 ≥ ... ≥ Pn, where popularity is defined
as the number of times that an alternative has been selected in the past. When there is a tie, the
agents choose which one to sample next at random. We call the order in which the alternatives are
searched the search path. The agents stop search when they encounter an alternative un with utility
higher than a threshold T ; otherwise, they continue sampling until the alternatives are exhausted.
The proposed model captures the behavioral regularities of search in online interfaces [Joachims et al.
2005; Craswell et al. 2008] and bolsters them with a fully fleshed-out utility framework.
3. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
We simulated markets consisting of 1000 agents that decided sequentially which of 100 alternatives to
choose, after searching the market according to public popularity information. We systematically var-
ied the diversity of preferences in the market, d, by setting the subjective variance of each individual
agent σ2s equal to d ∈ {0, 0.1, ..., 0.9, 1} and the variance of the objective utility σ2o equal to 1 − d. We
drew subjective utilities for each agent independently, whereas the draw of the objective utilities was
the same for all agents. Next, we varied the cost of search, c, that agents have to pay when sampling
an alternative, c = {1/22, 1/23, 1/24, 1/25, 1/26, 1/27, 1/28}. These costs correspond to the threshold pa-
rameters T = {0.34, 0.78, 1.15, 1.47, 1.76, 2.03, 2.28}; these parameters are optimal for a random search
model [Chow et al. 1971], which our agents used despite searching according to the popularity ranking.
This yields 11× 7 = 77 markets, each of which was simulated 1000 times to obtain stable averages.1
In Figure 1 (left), we illustrate the average utility and total cost for the agents in the market, focusing
on the second higher search cost case c = 1/23. In the maximum diversity case, d = 1, the environment
is recreated randomly for each agent. In this case, the popularity information is completely uninforma-
tive and welfare outcomes are equal to those in the market where agents search randomly. At d = 1,
agents incur the highest average total costs and earn the lowest average net utility from the market,
even though the thresholds they employ are optimally set. At d = 0, the alternative chosen by the first
agent satisfies all the subsequent agents in the population, leading to herding. In these markets, the
cost of search is minimal, and the obtained net utility is much higher than in the random search mar-
ket. Because the first agent may settle on a very good or a simply passable alternative, d = 0 implies
1The code for the simulations can be openly accessed at https://osf.io/up5pe/
.
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Fig. 1: The average net utility in the market is highest at intermediate levels of preference diversity. The lines
represent the average gross and net utility of the selected alternative and the average total cost of search at a
search cost of 1/23. The ribbons represent the variability in 1000 repetitions of the simulation. The beneficial
effect of diversity increases with the search cost. For each cost level, we illustrate the difference between the level
of diversity with the maximum net utility and conditions with no diversity, d = 0, and maximum diversity, d = 1.
more variability in the average utility in the market. This is illustrated by the ribbons in Figure 1
(left). Although the search costs are minimized, the economy does not maximize the collective welfare
of the agents involved. There is a robust non-monotonic relationship between d and the average net
utility—the highest level of utility is consistently achieved for d ≈ 0.2, whereas at high costs even
markets with d = 0.5 on average do better than markets with no diversity whatsoever. Although the
average agent incurs a higher average cost of search in markets with d > 0 than in a market with
d = 0, this loss is outweighed by the benefits of choosing alternatives with higher gross utility. Figure
1 (right) illustrates that the non-monotonic relation between diversity and collective utility persists
even at much lower costs of search, although the average differences between conditions decrease.
What is the mechanism that leads to an increase in average net utility in markets with some diver-
sity of preferences? In a market with no diversity whatsoever, everybody herds on the option selected
by the first individual. Occasionally, this turns out to be an excellent alternative. More often than
not, however, it is located just off the satisficing threshold. The collective welfare is initial outcome-
dependent [Page 2006]. In contrast, in markets with some diversity of preferences, agents do not al-
ways appreciate the choices of previous individuals and they venture further until they encounter a
satisficing option. With each choice, the search path followed by the agents improves. Eventually, al-
ternatives with higher objective utility components are more likely to occupy the first positions in the
search path. Thus, agents deciding later on in time possess a useful popularity signal, require rela-
tively few steps to find good alternatives, and tend to settle on better outcomes (Figure 1, gross utility).
In essence, some diversity of preferences allows the agents to benefit from the thick informational ex-
ternalities that are inherent in sequential social interactions. By searching and deciding, the agents
unintentionally provide useful information to the individuals deciding after them.
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